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Monetary policy in United Germany continued to be based on the broader 
monetary aggregate M3 in the years after the German Economic and Monetary 
Union (GEMU), which began on July 1st 1990. This aggegate was always above 
target in the years after GEMU, making it difficult for the Bundesbank to reduce 
interest rates at a time when the German and the European economies were 
depressed; this was true particularly for 1992 and 1993. In the first half of 1994 
the growth of M3 greatly exceeded the target range set for 1994 (4-6%), 
reaching peaks of 15-22% on an annual basis. Naturally, a high variability of a 
monetary aggregate does not necessarily imply instability of the underlying 
demand function: it may just be the result of a high variability of the variables 
included as arguments in the function. The issue of the stability of a demand 
function is a relative one, as stablility depends also on the number of variables 
included in the function.
In setting M3 targets for the year ahead the Bundesbank considers 
implicitly a demand function which has only the price level and potential output 
as arguments, but also takes secular changes in velocity into account. 
Assuming homogeneity of degree one in prices, it fixes the main objective of its 
policy -the "unavoidable" part of inflation- at 2% (even when reasonable 
inflation forecasts for the year ahead are much higher), taking into account the 
growth of German potential output (the growth of which is normally set at 2- 
2.5%) and a trend annual decline in velocity of 0.5%. It calculates the desired 
growth of M3, around which a band of +/- 1% is applied. Other explanatory 
variables like short or long term German interest rates, those reflecting currency 
substitution with the dollar or with European currencies or the own rate of 
return on M3 play no role in this exercise (or it is implicitly assumed that they 
remain constant during the year ahead). If either as a result of increased 
credibility of the Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM) of the European Monetary 
System (EMS), or of increased international financial integration, currency 
substitution is an important determinant of the demand for real M3, the demand 
function used by the Bundesbank will be unstable. The neglect of other possibly 
significant variables besides currency substitution leads to the same conclusion.
However, the Bundesbank may still be pursuing the very best policy 
conceivable, if the net effect of all neglected variables in the year ahead can be 
assumed to be zero. But the oveshooting of the growth of M3 above the upper 
margin of the target band of the last years, and especially that of the first half 
of 1994, justify a strong presumption that the demand function used by the 



























































































In a recent empirical paper on the demand for money in the ERM and in 
the main member countries Tullio, de Souza and Giucca (1996) show, using the 
error correction model, that the German demand for real M3 was relatively well 
behaved from 1979(2) to 1989(2), provided one includes among the explanatory 
variables the short term interest rate and a term reflecting currency substitution 
with the US dollar.2 The only caveat is that the regression for broad money 
does not pass the functional form mis-specification F-test. Second, they show 
that if one excludes the term reflecting substitution with the US dollar the 
regression breaks down completely. Third, when extending the sample period to 
1992(3) to include the period after the fall of the Berlin wall, the demand 
functions for both Ml and M3 become highly unstable even when the terms 
reflecting currency substitution are included. The fit and the residuals of the 
demand for real Ml worsen somewhat less, suggesting that the latter function 
may have withstood better the reunification shock.
This suggests that currency substitution with the US dollar is very 
important as an argument of the German demand functions for narrow and broad 
money and more important than for France and Italy, while substitution with the 
ERM currencies is in general less significant. This may have to do with the fact 
that capital controls played an important role in Europe for most of the sample 
period, that the dollar is more heavily traded than other currencies and that 
during the EMS period nominal and real exchange rate changes within Europe 
were held in check much more than DM-US dollar changes, at least between 
realignments.
This chapter extends the analysis of the previous paper in three directions. 
First, the significance and the implications for stability and for the role of 
currency substitution of the inclusion of a number of additional explanatory 
variables is explored. The additional variables are: the own rate of return on M3, 
the differential between the long and the short term interest rate and a measure 
of the volatility of the DM-dollar rate. In addition, an attempt has been made to 
express the real money stocks and GDP in per capita terms and to check whether 
the interest rate differential between Germany and the US provides a better 
measure of currency substitution than deviations of the DM-US dollar rate from 
PPP. Second, in the first study no dummies were added for the quarters around 
July 1st 1990 in the regressions covering the period up to 1992(3); this may 
strongly bias the results in favour of the hypothesis of increased instability of the 
demand functions after GEMU. In this study we include quarterly dummies for 
the reunification shock to check the robustness of the conclusion that the 
demand functions have become more unstable. Third the sample period for the
2 This is measured by the deviations of the DM-dollar rate from purchasing power parity 




























































































regressions covering the post-reunification period has been extended from 
1992(3) to 1993(4), the last available observation at the time the data bank for 
this study was set up. This is particularly relevant for the analysis of the role 
played by intra-ERM currency substitution in the German demand functions, as 
the degree of financial market integration among ERM countries has increased 
significantly only in the second half of the 1980’s, and particularly, after France 
and Italy abolished all capital controls by 1990. This may be one of the reasons 
why in this chapter intra-ERM currency substitution turns out to be much more 
significant than in Tullio, de Souza and Giucca (1995).
The remainder of the chapter is structured as follows: Section 1 presents 
a brief review of the previous results by Tullio, de Souza and Giucca. Section 
2 presents the new estimates of the real demand functions for German Ml and 
M3 with the three additional explanatory variables ( the own rate of return on 
M3, the differential between the long and the short term interest rate and a 
measure of the volatility of the DM-dollar exchange rate) for the period 1979(2) 
to 1989(2). Section 3 extends the estimates to 1993(4) with the reunification 
dummies added along with the three new explanatory variables. Section 4 
concludes. Two appendices are added: Appendix 1 presents the results with an 
alternative measure of currency substitution with the US dollar (the long term 
interest rate differential between the two countries) and Appendix 2 shows the 
results with money and GDP expressed per capita.
1- Review of previous results
Table 1 contains the demand functions for real Ml and M3 estimated for 
Germany by Tullio, de Souza and Giucca (1995). The sample period is 1979(2), 
the initial quarter of the EMS , to 1989(2), when expectations of big political 
changes in Eastern Europe became widespread. The model used is the errror 
correction model as it was thought to be the most appropriate to superimpose a 
short run dynamics on a long run function. In the long run the demand for real 
money is assumed to depend on real GDP, the short term interest rate and the 
percentage deviation of the DM-dollar exchange rate from purchasing power 
parity, a term reflecting currency substitution between DM and dollar deposits. 
The long run demand for money function is given by equation (1):
(1) LMP = a 0 + a,LY + a 2RS + a 3dPPP + u
where: the letter L always stands for the natural logarithm, MP is the real 
money stock, Y is real GDP, RS the short term interest rate, dPPP the 




























































































and u is the error term. The letter "d" always stands for a percentage deviation 
or a difference between two interest rates. Thus all variables, except interest 
rates or differences of interest rates and dPPP, are expressed in natural 
logarithms3.
The variables in equation (1) are cointegrated, but the DF and the ADF 
tests are not shown here to save space (see Table 5 of Tullio, de Souza and 
Giucca (1996)). In accordance with the error correction model, the dependent 
variable in Table 1 is the rate of change of the real money stock; in symbols 
DLMP where the letter "D" stands for a first difference. The rate of growth of 
the real money stock is assumed to be influenced by two sets of variables: a) the 
lagged levels of the explanatory variables in equation (1), reflecting the long run 
factors influencing money demand and b) the rate of change of real GDP 
(DLY), the first difference of the short term interest rate (DRS) and the first 
difference of the forward discount of the DM with the currencies that were 
participating in the ERM (DFD), reflecting intra ERM currency substitution. The 
variables listed under b) reflect short run influences.
The dynamic error correction version of the demand function can be 
estimated in one stage or in two stages, the latter implying the substitution into 
the ECM of the residuals of the OLS estimates of the cointegrating equation. All 
the equations in Tullio, de Souza and Giucca (1996) and those in the current 
chapter are estimated with the one stage procedure, following recent theoretical 
work which suggests its superiority with respect to the two-stage procedure. All 
the variables which enter in level form a cointegrated set, so that standard t-, F- 
and normal critical values can be used for inference. The latter is a necessary 
condition for the error correction models to hold.4
FD never turned out to be significant in the cointegrating equation. 
Currency substitution with the US dollar (dPPP) is instead very significant in the 
cointegrating equation for both aggregates, but more so for M l. As to short run 
dynamics the intra-ERM currency substitution term (DFD) is never significant; 
however, the coefficient of the forward discount itself (FD) is close to the 5% 
significance level only for M l. Why did we use two different measures of 
currency substitution, dPPP for DM-US dollar substitution and FD or DFD for 
the intra-ERM one, and why is the first one influencing in a very significant 
way the long run demand function, while the second is barely influencing the 
short run dynamics? The answers to these questions may be connected. It was 
mentioned in the introduction that capital controls played an important role in
3 The precise definition of the variables and the sources of the data are indicated in 
Appendix 3.
4 For a detailed description of cointegration and ECM see A. Banerjee, J. Dolado, J. W. 




























































































Europe for most of the sample period, that the dollar is more heavily traded than 
other currencies and that during the EMS period nominal and real exchange rate 
changes within Europe were held in check much more than DM-US dollar 
changes. Capital controls and the heavy trading in dollars explain the different 
importance of the two types of currency substitution, while the different 
exchange rate system (almost free floating for the dollar and the ERM for 
European currencies) explains the difference in the way currency substitution 
was measured. Intra-ERM currency substitution had to do mostly with 
expectations of realignments and deposits shifted within Europe before 
realignments have evidently tended to be repatriated after they were decided, 
leaving negligible effects beyond the very short run. Therefore we tend to 
consider FD and DFD more as dummy variables for realignments than as normal 
explanatory variables.
The series for Ml is seasonally unadjusted, while the one for M3 available 
from our source is seasonally adjusted. All the equations for Ml presented in 
this chapter include three quarterly dummies. The presence of the dummies 
among the explanatory variables increases the R2 by 10-15%. This extra 
explanatory power of the regressions for Ml should be kept in mind when one 
compares it with the adjusted R2 of the regressions for M3.
Overall the regression for Ml is the more satisfactory (regression 1). The 
residuals are extremely well behaved (although it should be noticed that a 
dummy variable has been added for the fourth quarter of 1987), the explanatory 
power is very high and the parameters are all significantly different from zero 
at the 1% level, except for the intra-ERM currency substitution term FD. For 
real M3 the results are not equally satisfactory: the null hypothesis of no 
functional form mis-specification is rejected at the 5% confidence level (Reset-F 
test); the explanatory power of the regression is substantially lower5 and the 
parameters are less precisely estimated; this holds in particular for the intra-ERM 
currency substitution term.
In order to further investigate the importance of the two currency 
substitution terms in the German demand for money functions, Tullio et alia 
presented first Wald-F tests for the exclusion of the terms, then they reestimated 
the equations by excluding the terms. We report their results in Tables 2 and 3 
below (their Tables 7 and 8, respectively). The first column of Table 2 suggests 
that the hypothesis of a zero restriction on the coefficient of the DM-US dollar 
substitution term in the demand function for real Ml is rejected at the 1% 
confidence level. The same holds for the hypothesis of a joint zero restriction 
on the coefficients of the two terms. The hypothesis of a zero restriction on the





























































































coefficient of the intra-ERM currency substitution term is rejected only at the 
10% confidence level. As to the demand for real M3 the hypothesis of a zero 
restriction on the coefficient of the DM-dollar term is rejected at the 5% 
confidence level and the joint restriction is rejected at the 10% level. These 
results indicate that currency substitution cannot be neglected in the German 
demand for money function, especially as far as Ml is concerned. Of the two 
forms of substitution, the one with the US dollar is much more relevant.
Table 3 contains the dynamic demand functions for real Ml and M3 
estimated by Tuilio et al. in which the currency substitution terms have been 
eliminated in two successive steps: first the less important intra-ERM term, then 
the more important DM-dollar term. Regressions (1) and (2) of Table 1 have 
been reported again in Table 3 in order to facilitate the comparison of the 
coefficients, the t-statistics and the standard tests on the residuals. Taking the 
demand for real Ml first, the elimination of the intra-ERM term causes little 
change in the coefficients and t-statistics (regression 3). However, the normality 
test on the residuals (N-CHI2(2)) indicates that the hypothesis of normality is 
rejected at the 5% confidence level. When we remove the DM-dollar term the 
regression breaks down, as all variables except the interest rate become 
insignificantly different from zero.
As to the real demand for M3, it should be recalled that regression 2 has 
already shown evidence of functional form mis-specification when all currency 
substitution terms were included. When one removes the intra-ERM term, the 
RESET-F test rejects the hypothesis of no functional form mis-specification at 
the 1% significance level (regression (5)) and when both currency substitution 
terms are excluded, all explanatory variables loose most of their significance and 
the error correction model breaks down.
So far we have only summarized the results obtained by Tuilio et al. 
which constitute the starting point for the present chapter. In the next section we 
reestimate the demand functions for real Ml and M3 for the same period 
1979(2) to 1989(2) with the inclusion of three additional exlanatory variables. 
In section 3 we extend the estimation period to 1993(4) using the larger set of 
explanatory variables and including dummy variables for the reunification shock 
of 1990 and beyond. The effect of the inclusion of the new variables, of the 
reunification dummies and of the extension of the sample period on the 
significance of the currency substitution terms and on the stability of the 




























































































2-The stability of Ml and M3 and the role of currency substitution revisited: 
1979(2V 1989(2')
Table 4 contains the estimates of the demand function for real Ml for the 
period 1979(2) to 1989(2). Regression 1 is the re-estimation of the same 
regression of the previous section (also reported in Tables 1 and 3 above); the 
slight differences are due to the revision in the data of real GDP in the latest 
estimates. Regression 7 includes two new explanatory variables: the variability 
of the nominal DM-dollar exchange rate measured by the variance of the 
exchange rate from quarter t-3 to t (VARER) and the differential beetween the 
long and the short term interest rate (dRLS). The best results are obtained when 
VARER in assumed to influence the cointegrating (long run) relationship and 
the interest rates differential (dRLS) the dynamics; hence a "D" appears in front 
of dRLS implying that it is entered as a first difference. The variability of the 
nominal exchange rate has a positive coefficient and is significant at the 1% 
level implying an increase in the demand for DM deposits when dollar exchange 
rate uncertainty increases. This result is not that surprising considering the 
history of the DM, of the US dollar and of inflation in the two countries. The 
differential between the long and the short term interest rate has the expected 
negative sign, but its coefficient is not significantly different from zero. With the 
inclusion of these two additional variables the significance of both currency 
substitution terms increases sharply and, in the case of the intra-ERM term, the 
absolute value of the coefficient increases by about 50%. The other parameters 
also change, but the changes are all within two standard errors. In particular, the 
coefficient on lagged real money balances (LMP), which indicates the rate at 
which the real money stock returns towards its initial equilibrium after a 
disturbance, with no change in any variable in the demand function, falls from 
49 to 42% per quarter. This implies a reduction of the speed of adjustment 
toward equilibrium from about 6 to 7 months, which is, however, still relatively 
rapid. The standard error of the regression falls by about 11%. The residuals are 
less well behaved when the new variables are included as there is now some 
evidence of autocorrelated residuals. The Chow forecast F-test performed with 
regression (7) from 1988(1) to 1989(2) does not show structural breaks in the 
relationship. The same holds if the initial quarter for the test is moved foreward 
until 1989(1). The Cusum Square test indicates instead a structural break at the 
beginning of 1989. The recursive parameter estimates on the coefficients of the 
currency substitution terms do not show significant changes through time (graphs 
not shown here). Finally, Table 5 shows the Wald F-tests for the exclusion of 
the currency substitution terms in regression (7). To conclude, the analysis of 
Tables 4 and 5 indicates that, with the inclusion of the new variables (VARER 




























































































important in the demand for real Ml. As before, without the currency 
substitution terms the EC-model breaks down (cf. regression (8) of Table 4 with 
regression (1)).
The estimates of the demand function for real M3 are presented in Table 
6. Regression (9), which does not include the new explanatory variables, is the 
same as regression (2) of Table 1; the small differences in the parameter 
estimates are all due to slight revisions in the series of real GDP. The new 
variables in regression (10) now include also the differential between the own 
rate of return on M3 and the short term interest rate (dROS); for Ml the 
inclusion of this variable was not necessary since no interest is paid on Ml in 
Germany. While in regression (10) the coefficients of the exchange rate 
variability (VARER) and of the differential between the long and the short term 
interest rate (dRLS) are significantly different from zero and have the right sign, 
the coefficient of DdROS has the right sign but is not significant. The inclusion 
of the new variables has three main consequences: a) the intra-ERM currency 
substitution term becomes significant, b) the absolute values of the coefficient 
on lagged money (LMP) and lagged real GDP fall to about one half of the 
previous values, which implies that the adjustment speed falls from about 12 to 
30 months and c) the hypothesis of no functional form mis-specification now 
cannot be rejected, while for regression (9) it was rejected at the 5% significance 
level (Reset F-test; cf. the bottom line of regression (9) and (10) in Table 6 ). 
Thus, although with the inclusion of the new variables, the rate of adjustment 
becomes somewhat low (from 24 to 10% per quarter), regression (10) is overall 
more satisfactory. Table 7 reports the Wald F-tests for the deletion of the 
currency substitution terms; the tests indicate that the terms cannot be deleted 
at the 5% level of significance both individually and jointly. This differs from 
the previous results, for which only the DM-dollar term appeared significant at 
the 5% level (cf. Table 7 with Table 2). Again, if one removes the currency 
substitution terms from regression (10), the EC-model breaks down (regression 
( 11))-
As for M l, the Chow Forecast F-test for regression (10) indicates no 
structural break during the last years of the estimation period at the 1% 
significance level (results not shown here). The Cusum Square test also suggests 
that the relationship is stable (Fig 1). The recursive parameter estimates on the 
coefficients of the currency substitution terms suggest instead a significant 
increase in the absolute value of both coefficients in the course of 1985 (Fig. 2 
and 3). This finding lends itself to an interesting interpretation: after the French 
U-turn of 1983, the ERM became more credible, capital mobility increased 
gradually and had already reached a high level well before France and Italy 
completely abolished capital controls in the late 1980’s; in addition, inflation 




























































































on the internal market was approved by the Heads of State in 1985. A sa result, 
the influence of both types of currency substitution on the German demand for 
money increased sharply. For a similar conclusion, that between 1983 and 1986 
the EMS changed significantly several behavioural relationships in some 
countries of the ERM, including Germany, see Artus and Salomon (1995), De 
Jong (1995) and Tullio and Ronci (1994). In particular, De Jong (1995) shows 
that expectations of German producer prices were influenced more than before 
by foreign variables starting in 1985, while Artus and Salomon (1995) show that 
the weight of French wages relative to German wages fell rapidly in the 
equation determining the French GDP-delator after 1985, and that the influence 
of the FF-DM exchange rate on the French-German interest rate differential fell 
sharply in the 1983-87 period. Finally Tullio and Ronci (1994) show in a paper 
analyzing the determinants of Italian inflation in the 1970’s and 1980’s that, 
after 1983, the influence of the Italian money stock on Italian inflation fell 
significantly at the expense of German inflation.
In sum the inclusion of the new explanatory variables strengthens 
considerably the role of currency substitution both in the demand for real Ml 
and real M3. This is particularly the case for intra-ERM currency substitution. 
In addition the inclusion of the new explanatory variables makes the demand for 
real M3 considerably more well behaved than before, while some worsening in 
the behaviour of the residuals of the Ml function is observed. Currency 
substitution is not only extremely important; in the demand for real M3 it 
becomes incresingly important after 1985, especially as far as the DM-dollar 
substitution is concerned (Fig.3). In the next section we extend the sample 
period to 1993(4).
3-The stability of Ml and M3 and the role of currency substitution after the 
fall of the Berlin wall revisited; 1979(21-1993(4')
The estimates of the demand function for real M l for the extended period 
are contained in Table 8. Regression (12), which includes the new explanatory 
variables but not the dummies for the unification shock, is not well behaved 
since the residuals are heteroscedastic and not normally distributed. In addition, 
there is a significant change in several coefficients; in particular the absolute 
values of the coefficient of the lagged money stock and of lagged real GDP 
increase by about 50% (cf. regression (12) of Table 8 with regression (7) of 
Table 4). With the unification dummies (one for each of the first 3 quarters of 
1990) the residuals become homoscedasitc and most of the coefficients show 
robustness with those of the equation estimated for the pre-unification period (cf. 




























































































normal and only by removing the last observation or by adding a dummy for the 
last quarter of 1993, do the residuals pass the normality test (regression (14) of 
Table 8).
The coefficients of the currency substitution terms in regression (14) have 
exactly the same values as in regression (7) with a further increase in the 
already very high significance of the DM-dollar substitution (t-statistics of dPPP 
increases from 6.81 in regression (7) to 7.79 in regression (14)). The Chow 
Forecast F-test, the Cusum Square test and the recursive parameter estimates 
cannot be performed on regression (14) because of the presence of the dummies. 
In order to get more information on the stability of the function and on the 
parameter values we fall back on regression (13) or (12). The Chow Forecast-F 
tests performed with regression (13) for the periods 1991(1) to 1993(4), 1992(1) 
to 1993(4) and 1993(1) to 1993(4) all indicate a structural break at the 1% level 
of significance, despite the inclusion of three unification dummies. The Cusum 
Square test performed on the residuals of regression (12) indicates one large 
structural break at the beginning of 1990 and two smaller ones in the first 
quarter of 1991 and in the last quarter of 1993 (fig. 4). Fig. 5 contains the 
recursive parameter esimates for regression (12) on the coefficient of dPPP. The 
figure shows a significant increase in the weight of the DM-dollar substitution 
in the first half of 1990 which continues until the end of 1991 when there were 
reunification fears on the part of financial markets and laxer German monetary 
policy followed by a partial recovery in 1992 and 1993 due to a very restrictive 
stance of German monetary policy despite the recession. Considering the 
significance of the DM-dollar substitution and its increasing importance, it is not 
surprising that, if one removes the term from regression (14), the EC-model 
breaks down.
Moving on to the demand function for real M3, regression (15) of Table 
9 shows that without unification dummies the extension of the estimation period 
produces enormous problems in the residuals. While with the inclusion of the 
new variables the residuals were very well behaved until 1989(2) (regression 
(10) of Table 6) now they are autocorrelated, heteroscedastic and not normally 
distributed (regression (15) of Table 9). In addition the functional form is mis- 
specified according to the Reset-F test. The inclusion of three dummies around 
the unification shock (the third and fourth quarter of 1990 and the first of 1991) 
a six month lag with respect to real Ml removes all the problems with the 
residuals and the coefficients of lagged M3 and dPPP assume their previous 
values (cf. regression (16) of Table 9 with regression (10) of Table 6). Although 
the coefficient of the intra-ERM currency substitution term becomes 
insignificant, the deletion of dPPP is rejected at the 5% significance level. If one 
removes the currency substitution terms, the EC-model breaks down as usual 




























































































6 shows the Cusum Square test performed with regression (16): it shows a 
structural break in 1992 and then again in 1993. These breaks are confirmed by 
the Chow tests for the periods 1992(1) to 1993(4) and 1993(1) and 1993(4) 
which indicate structural breaks at the 1% level of significance.
Because of the presence of the reunification dummies, the recursive 
parameter estimates have been performed with regression (15). Fig. 7 shows the 
time profile of the coefficient of dPPP. In addition to the significant 1985 jump 
in the absolute value of the coefficient recorded already in the estimation for the 
shorter period (Fig. 3), one observes, as with M l, a further significant increase 
in 1990 and 1991. For both changes in the value of this coefficient an 
interpretation has been already offered above: as to the 1985 jump, the ERM 
became more credible and capital controls in France and Italy stopped being 
binding around that time and as to the 1990-91 jump there was a loss in 
confidence in the DM caused by unification fears and lax monetary policy in 
Germany.
4- Summary and conclusions
This chapter has analysed the stability of the demand functions for 
German real Ml and M3 before and after the fall of the Berlin wall up to 
1993(4), with particular attention being devoted to the role played by the 
changing degree of international financial market integration and the increased 
credibility of the ERM on the significance of currency substitution for Germany. 
The effects of the reunification shock on the stability of the functions and on the 
role of currency substitution is also analysed separately for the two aggregates.
Three proxies have been used to measure the effect of currency 
substitution: the percentage deviation of the nominal DM-dollar exchange rate 
from Purchasing Power Parity, measuring substitution of assets included in the 
German money stocks with dollar assets; the forward discount of the DM with 
the currencies participating in the ERM, measuring substitution with ERM assets, 
and the variability of the DM-dollar exchange rate which reflects uncertainty 
about the value of the US dollar.
The starting point of this chapter is a study by Tullio, de Souza and 
Giucca (1996) covering the period 1979(2)-1992(3) on the stability of the ERM- 
wide and German demand for money in which it is shown that currency 
substitution with the US dollar is very important for the ERM-wide and for the 
German money stocks and that the German demand for Ml and M3 become 
unstable after the fall of the Berlin wall. The present chapter attempts to 
improve the previous specification of the German demand for real money by 




























































































DM-dollar exchange rate which always turns out to be significant and with a 
positive sign, suggesting a flight into the DM when the variability of the dollar 
increases, the differential between the German long and short term interest rate 
which is generally significant and with the right (negative) sign, and the 
differential between the own rate of return on M3 and the short term interest rate 
which generally has the right (positive) sign, but is not significant.
As a result of the inclusion of these variables, M3 becomes more stable 
during the pre-unification period and the intra-ERM currency substitution 
becomes very significant both for Ml and for M3, while in the previous 
specification it was not. The estimates up to 1993(4) show that these currency 
substitution terms are very significant and suggest an increasing importance of 
currency substitution through time. This is particularly true for the DM-dollar 
currency substitution, as its removal from the regressions always causes a 
breakdown of the otherwise very satisfactory EC-model. In addition, both the 
intra-ERM and the DM-dollar substitution terms increase in weight in 1985 and 
in 1990-91. In 1985 the existing exchange rate parities within the ERM became 
more credible, the internal market was launched and progress was made towards 
a more integrated European financial market, with Italy and France assuming a 
more relaxed stance towards capital controls for their residents. In 1990-91 fears 
about the conseqences of German reunification superimposed on furher capital 
liberalization in Europe caused a second significant increase in the weight of 
both currency substitution terms.
Despite the inclusion of 3-4 dummies for reunification we are unable to 
find stable demand for money functions after the fall of the Berlin wall. Clearly 
the consequences of the reunification shock on the German demand for money 
function were not yet over in 1993 and/or one ought to try to furhter improve 
the specification by including West European real GDP (excluding the German 
one), Eastern European GDP and perhaps Russian inflation.
However, our objective was not to find a stable demand function for M3 
in Germany before and after unification. Our objective was twofold. First, to 
show that, without taking into account rapidly increasing foreign influences 
(currency substitution), there was no such thing as a stable demand for real M3 
in Germany before the fall of the Berlin wall. Second to show that, after the fall 
of the wall, the demand function for M3 which was stable before (with currency 
substitution terms with the dollar and with other European currencies) starts 






























































































Appendix 1 - An alternative measure of DM-dollar currency substitution: the 
US-German lone term interest rate differential (dRLI
Table A.l contains the estimates of regression (7) and (14) 
(relating to M l) where the DM-dollar substitution term dPPP has been 
substituted with the long term interest rate differential between the two countries 
(dRL). The numbers of the regressions correspond to the ones in the text For the 
1979(2)-1989(2) period the results are clearly inferior. Even though the residuals 
pass all the tests, the coefficient of lagged money becomes insignificantly 
differet from zero, suggesting that the EC-model breaks down. For the extended 
sample period the regression (14a) is quite satisfactory and would compare 
relatively well with regression (14) of table 8 if the coefficient of lagged money 
did not fall to one third of the previous value. Table A.2 presents the re­
estimation of regression (10) and (16) relating to M3. The results not as 
satisfactory as when one uses dPPP. Although the residuals are well behaved and 
the DM-dollar currency substitution term is always significant, the coefficient 
of lagged money falls by about one third and becomes insignificantly different 
from zero. This is the reason why the term dPPP was preferred in this chapter.
Appendix 2 - Scale variables expressed per capita
The division of real M3 and of real GDP by population leads to a slight 
improvement in the estimation results for the pre-unification period. This is 
shown in Table A-3 where estimates for real M3 are presented for the period 
1979(2) to 1989(2). Regression (10) of table 6 is duplicated here to facilitate the 
comparison. The t-statistics of both currency substitution terms increase slightly 
and the absolute value of lagged money increases by 50% implying a faster and 
more plausible speed of convergence towards equilibrium. However for the 
extended sample period the per capita correction worsens the results 
considerably. The results for the 1979(2)-1993(4) period are not shown here to 





























































































Appendix 3 - Data description and sources
LM1 = logarithm of Money (Ml), seasonally unadjusted. Source International
Financial Statistics (IFS) of the IMF, line 34.
LM3 = logarithm of Money (M3), seasonally adjusted. Source Bundesbank
Consumer Price Index, base year 1985. Source: International Financial Statistics
(IFS), line 64. For the period 1990.3-1993.4 the price index for the whole of
Germany is a weighted average of West and East with a weighted of the West
and of 0.16 for the East.
LY = logarithm of real GDP, base year 1985. Source: OECD Quarterly National 
Accounts.
RS = Short-term interest rate. Source International Financial Statistics (IFS), 
line 60b (Call Money Rate)
RL = Long-term interest rate. Source International Financial Statistics (IFS), line 
61 (Government Bond Yield)
FD = Intra - ERM Currency subscription. It is defined as weighted average of 
the 3 months forward discount rates of the Belgian franc, French franc, 
Danish kroner, Irish pound, Italian lira and Dutch guilder with respect to 
the German mark.
dPPP = DM-dollar currency substituiton. It is defined as (E-PPP)/PPP, 
where E is the spot exchange rate of the US dollar in DM, and 
PPP, the purchasing power parity level, is defined as the ratio of 
the German consumer price index (base 1985, see above for source) 
to the US consumer price index (source IFS, line 64), scaled to 
equal the average spot exchange rate of the US dollar in DM during 
1985:
dRL = DM-dollar currency substitution, calculated as the differential 
between US and German long term interest rates. Source for the 
long-term interest rates: International Financial Statistics (IFS), line 
61 (Government Bond Yield).




























































































VARER = Exchange rate volatility, calculated as the variance, over four 
observations, of the market rate. Source for the market rate: 
International Financial Statistics (IFS), line rf.
dROS = differential between M3-Own rate of return (Source: Bundesbank) 
and short-term interest rate.
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TABLE 1 German money demand function:- EC-model, EMS period, 1979(2)-I989(2)
No. o f regression (1) (2)
Definition of money Ml M3
explanatory variables:
constant -3.62 (-6 06) -1.47 (-2.95)
DLY 0.82 (5 03) 0.38 (2 40)
DRS -1.38 (-5.29) -0.64 (-2.41)
DRS(-l) - -0.59 (-2.59)
FD -0.17 (-1.95) -0.05 (-0 62)
LM P(-l) -0 48 (-5 81) -0.25 (-3.02)
LY(-l) 1.05(6.20) 0.53 (3.12)
RS(-l) -0.83 (-7.26) -0.27 (-2.79)
dPPP(-l) -0.14 (-6.09) -0.03 (-2.44)
D874 -0 03 (-2.79) —
r 2 Adjusted 0.979 0.502
SER 0 009 0.008
DW 1.98 2.09
AR-CHI2 (4) 0.85 (0.84) 2.70 (0.44)
AR-F (4) 0.18(0.91) 0 68 (0.67)
ARCH-CHI2 (4) 1.19(0.76) 2 57 (0.46)
ARCH-F (4) 0.25 (0 86) 0 63 (0.60)
N-JB 1.37(0.50) 1.54(0.46)
RESET-F (1) 0.23 (0.64) 6.44 (0.02)*
- t-statistics or probabilities o f rejection of the null hypothesis when the latter is true in parenthesis.




























































































Table 2 Wald F-te$t for exclusion of currency substitution terms
(see regression (1) and (2) in Table 1, sample period 1979 (2)-1989 (2) )
Definition of money Ml M3
No. o f  regression (1) (2)
zero restriction on coefficient o f 
FD (intra-ERM)
F = 3 81 (0 06) F = 0.39 (0.54)
zero restriction on coefficient of 
dPPP(-l)(US S)
F = 37.03 (0 00)** F = 5.97 (0 02)*
zero restriction on coefficients 
o fFD and dPPP(-l)
F = 19.55 (0 00)** F = 2.99 (0 06)
Probabilities of rejection of the null hypothesis when the latter is true in parenthesis




























































































TABLE 3 German money demand function:- EC-model with and without currency
substitution terms, EMS period, 1979(2)-1989(2)
N o . o f  
re g re s s io n
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
D e f in itio n  o f  
m o n e y
e x p la n a to r y
v a r i a b le s
Ml Ml M l M3 M3 M3
constant -3  62  (-6  06) -3 .2 9  (5 .4 9 ) -0 .5 9  ( -1 .1 4 ) -1 .4 7  (-2 .9 5 ) -1 .3 3  (-3 .01) -0 7 0  (-1 8 5 )
DLY 0 82 (5 .0 3 ) 0  79  (4 6 8 ) 0 .3 9 ( 1 .8 0 ) 0  38 (2 .4 0 ) 0 .3 6  (2 .34) 0 .2 2 ( 1  4 5 )
DRS -1 38 (-5 .2 9 ) -1 62  (-6 .8 3 ) -1 .5 3  (-4  54) -0  64 (-2 .4 1 ) -0 .7 0  (-2 .81) -0 .3 9  (-1 .7 2 )
DRS(-l) - - - -0 .5 9  (-2 .5 9 ) -0 .5 9  (-2 .61) -0 4 0  (-1 78)
FD -0  17 (-1 95) - - -O 05  ( - 0  62 ) - -
LM P(-l) -0  48  (-5  81) -0 .4 7  (-5  49 ) -0 .0 4  (-0 .7 1 ) •0 .2 5  (-3 .02) -0 .24  (-2 .98) -0 10 (-1 .7 1 )
LY(-I) 1 05 (6 .2 0 ) 0  99  (5 .6 9 ) 0 .1 5 ( 1 .1 4 ) 0 .5 3  (3 .1 2 ) 0  49  (3 .11) 0 .2 3  (1 89)
R S(-l) -0  83 (-7 .2 6 ) -0 .81  (-6 .7 8 ) -0 .3 8  ( -2 .9 0 ) -0 .2 7  (-2 .7 9 ) -0 .2 5  (-2 .75) •0 .1 6  (-1 8 3 )
dPPP(-l) -0  14 (-6  09) -0 .1 4  (-5  68 ) - -0  03 (-2 .4 4 ) -0  03 (-2 .39) -
D874 -0  03 (-2 .7 9 ) -0 0 3  (-2 .5 8 ) -0  0 2  ( -1 .6 2 ) - - -
R 2 A d ju s ted 0 .979 0 .9 7 6 0 .9 5 0 0.502 0 .496 0 .4 0 9
SER 0 009 0 0 0 9 0 .0 1 3 0 0 0 8 0 008 0 008
DW 1.98 2.01 1.75 2 0 9 2.15 1.99
A R -C H I2  (4 ) 0  85 (0 .84) 0 .7 9  (0  86) 3 .3 6  (0 .3 4 ) 2 .7 0  (0  44 ) 3 .35  (0 .34) 3 .2 0  (0  3 7 )
A R -F  (4 ) 0  18 (0 .91) 0  18 (0 .9 1 ) 0 .8 3  (0 .4 9 ) 0  68  (0  67 ) 0 .8 9  (0 .45) 0  88  (0 .4 6 )
A R C H -C H 1 2
(4 )
1 1 9 (0  76) 1.63 (0  6 5 ) 2 .0 8  (0 .5 5 ) 2 .5 7  (0  46) 5 01 (0 .17) 6  70  (0  0 8 )
A R C H -F  (4 ) 0  25 (0 .86) 0 .3 5  (0 .7 8 ) 0  4 8  (0 .7 0 ) 0 .63  (0 .60) 1.37 (0 .27) 2 .0 0 (0 .1 4 )
N -JB 1 .3 7 (0 .5 0 ) 7 .3 4  (0  0 3)* 0 .2 2  (0 .9 0 ) 1 5 4 (0 .4 6 ) 1 .5 0 (0 .4 7 ) 1.40 (0 .5 0 )
R E S E T -F  (1 ) 0.23 (0 .6 4 ) 0 .6 5  (0 .4 3 ) 2 .0 0 ( 0 .1 7 ) 6  44  (0 02)* 8  7 1 (0 .0 1 )” 6 .1 6 ( 0  0 2 )*
- t-statistics or probabilities of rejection of the null hypothesis when the latter is true in parenthesis.




























































































TABLE 4 German demand function for real M l - EC-model, EMS period, 1979(2)-1989(2)
No. of regression: (1) (7) (8)
explanatory variables
constant -3 89 (-5 68) -2 96 (-5.29) 0 05 (0 09)
DLY 0.80 (4.56) 0.77 (4 96) 0 31 (1 36)
DRS -1 39 (-5.11) • -1.64 (-4 45) -2.15 (-3.99)
FD -0.21 (-2.25) -0 30 (-3.28) —
LM P(-l) -0 49 (-5.55) -0 42 (-4.94) 0 04 (0 48)
LY (-l) 1.03 (5 86) 0.88 (5 36) -0 03 (0.17)
R S(-l) -0.81 (-7.00) -0 78 (-7.46) -0.35 (-2.57)
dPPP(-l) -0.15 (-5.88) -0.15 (-6.81) -
D874 -0.03 (-2.97) -0 03 (-3.25) -0 02 (-1.40)
VARER(-l) - 0 004 (3 02) 0 002 (0.97)
DdRLS — -0 005 (-1.23) -0 008 (-1.36)
R2 Adjusted 0.968 0.975 0.933
SER 0.009 0.008 0.013
DW 1 89 2.38 1.81
AR-CH12 (4) 5 86 (0.21) 11 39(0  023)* 4 45 (0 35)
AR-F (4) 1.04 (0.41) 2.21 (0 099) 0 76 (0.56)
ARCH-CH12 (4) 1.46 (0 83) 1.13 (0.89) 1.82 (0.77)
ARCH-F (4) 0.33 (0 86) 0.25(0 91) 0 41 (0.80)
N-JB 0.50 (0 78) 0.91 (0 63) 0.35(0 84)
RESET-F (1) 0.19(0 67) 0.27 (0 61) 1.68 (0.21)
- t-statistics or probabilities o f rejection o f the null hypothesis when the latter is true in parenthesis.




























































































Table 5 Wald F-test for exclusion of currency substitution terms in Ml
(see regression (7) and (8) in Table 4 ; sample period 1979 (2)-1989 (2) )
zero restriction on coefficient o f FD
zero restriction on coefficient o f dPPP(-l)
zero restriction on coefficients o f FD and 
dPPP(-l)
F = 10.76 (0 00?)** 
F = 46.33 (0.000)** 
F = 24 89 (0 000)**
Probabilities of rejection o f the null hypothesis when the latter is true in parenthesis 




























































































TABLE 6 German demand function for real M3 - EC-model, EMS period, 1979(2)-1989(2)
No. of regression : (9) (10) (11)
explanatory variables
constant -1.24 (-2 72) -0.92 (-1 77) -0 02 (-0 04)
DLY 031 (1.94) 0 20(1 27) 0 005(0 03)
DRS -0 62 (-2 27) • -0 32 (-1 14) -0 15 (-0 62)
DRS(-l) -0 59 (-2 52) -0 75 (-2 41) -0 86 (-2 57)
FD -0 06 (-0 74) -0 19 (-2 16) -
LMP(-l) -0 24 (-2 85) -0.10 (-1.14) 0 04 (0 49)
LY(-l) 0 47 (2 93) 0 27(1 48) -0 04 (-0 23)
RS(-I) -0 25 (-2 64) -0 18 (-2 01) -0 09 (-1 00)
dPPP(-l) -0.04 (-2.38) -0 03 (-2 39) -
VARER(-l) - 0 004 (2 73) 0 003 (1 89)
DdRLS(-l) - -0 007 (-1.97) -0 010 (-2 62)
DdROS - 0 004 (0 96) -0 0002 (-0 05)
RJ adjusted 0 356 0 516 0 421
SER 0 008 0 007 0 008
DW 2 01 2 22 2 10
AR-CHI2 (4) 2.30(0 68) 3 36(0 50) 2 70 (0 61)
AR-F (4) 0 42(0 80) 0 55 (0 70) 0 47(0 75)
ARCH-CHI2 (4) 1 78 (0 78) 4 28 (0 37) 6 75 (0 15)
ARCH-F (4) 0 40 (0 80) I 05 (0 40) 1 79 (0.16)
N-JB 1.18 (0 55) 0 29 (0 87) 0 25 (0 88)
RESET-F (1) 6 43 (0 012)* 1 09 (0 30) 1.23 (0 28)
t-statistics or probabilities of rejection of the null hypothesis when the latter is true in parenthesis 




























































































Table 7 Wald F-test for exclusion of currency substitution terms in M3
(see regression (10) in Table 6 ; sample period 1979 (2)-1989 (2) )
zero restriction on coefficient of FD
zero restriction on coefficient of dPPP(-l)
zero restriction on coefficients o f FD and 
dPPP(-l)
F = 4 65 (0 04)* 
F = 5 71 (0 02)’ 
F'= 3 94 (0 03)*
Probabilities of rejection of the null hypothesis when the latter is true in parenthesis 




























































































TABLE 8 German demand function for real M l - EC-model, EMS period, 1979(2)-1993(4)
No. of regression : (12) (13) (14)
explanatory variables
constant -4 26 (-6 34) -3 23 (-6 10) -3 13 (-7.54)
DLY 1 09(7  73) ' 0 80 (6 65) 0 79 (8 37)
DRS -1.95 (-2.74) • -161 (-3.14) -1.35 (-3.34)
FD -0 17 (-0 90) -0 25 (-1 87) -0 31 (-2 90)
LMP(-I) -0 62 (-5 92) -0 44 (-5.28) -0 43 (-6 53)
LY(-I) 1 28 (6 36) 0 95 (5 91) 0 92 (7 32)
RS(-I) -0.90 (-5 86) -0 82 (-7 46) -0 80 (-9.23)
dPPP(-I) -0 19 (-5 63) -0.15 (-5.93) -0 15 (-7.79)
D874 -0 03 (-1 59) -0 04 (-2 59) -0 04 (-3 23)
VARER(-l) 0 0006 (0 21) 0 0017(0 84) 0.004 (2.37)
DdRLS -0.005 (-0 72) -0 0005 (-0 09) -0 0002 (-0 04)
D901 - -0 04 (-2.57) -0 04 (-3.17)
D902 - 0 07 (4 44) 0 07 (6 12)
D903 - 0 07 (4 26) 0 07 (5 66)
D934 — 0 06 (5.25)
R- adjusted 0 908 0956 0973
SER 0 018 0013 0 010
DW 1.68 1 65 2.19
AR-CHI2 (4) 6 87 (0 14) 1 34 (0 85) 4 81 (031)
AR-F (4) 1.35(0 27) 0 22 (0 93) 0 82 (0 52)
ARCH-CHI2 (4) 19 96 (0 001)** 2.17(0.70) 6 99(0.14)
ARCH-F (4) 7.12 (0.00)** 0 51 (0 73) 1.82 (0.14)
N-JB 14 96 (0 00)** 72 18(0 00)** 2 57(0 28)
RESET-F (1) 3 73 (0 06) 0 03 (0 86) 0 001 (0 97)
- t-statistics or probabilities o f rejection of the null hypothesis when the latter is true in parenthesis




























































































TABLE 9 German demand function for real M3 - EC-model, EMS period, 1979(2)-1993(4)
No. of regression : (15) (16) (17)
explanatory variables
constant -137  (-4 16) -0 53 (-2 22) -0 19 (-0 95)
DLY 0 36(2  99) 0 28 (3 26) 0 21 (2 43)
DRS -0.44 (-0 81) • -0 29 (-104) -0 24 (-0 94)
DRS(-l) -1 11 (-1.69) -0 75 (-2.27) -0 70 (-2 07)
FD -0.08 (-0 45) -0 15 (-1 58) -
LM P(-l) -0.34 (-4.82) -0 09 (-141) -0 03 (-0 58)
LY(-l) 0 61 (4 89) 0 18 (1.82) 0 07 (0 75)
RS(-l) -0.39 (-2.78) -0 22 (-2.94) -0 14 (-1 97)
dPPP(-l) -0 06 (-2 38) -0 03 (-2.25) --
VARER(-l) 0 002 (0 80) 0 003 (2.37) 0.002 (141)
DdRLS(-l) -0 04 (-0 65) -0 006 (-1 85) -0 005 (-1 64)
DdROS -0 008 (-0 82) 0 0004 (0 09) -0 001 (-0 24)
D903 -- 0 06 (4 75) 0 07 (5 27)
D904 - -0 02 (4 75) 0 07 (5 27)
D911 — 0 11 (9 46) 0 12(9 94)
R2 adjusted 0 326 0 835 0 819
SER 0018 0 009 0009
DW 2.86 2.17 2.03
AR-CHI2 (4) 16.33 (0 003) ** 2 23 (0 69) 3 90 (0 42)
AR-F (4) 4 11 (0.007)** 0 39 (0 81) 0 74 (0.57)
ARCH-CHI2 (4) 10.38(0 03)* 1.24 (0 87) 1 03 (0.91)
ARCH-F (4) 2.92 (0.03)* 0 29 (0.88) 0 24 (0 92)
N-JB 129.35 (0.00)** 0.31 (0 86) 0 22 (0 90)
RESET-F (1) 7.58 (0 008)** 0 16(0 69) 0 61 (0 44)
- t-statistics or probabilities of rejection of the null hypothesis when the latter is true in parenthesis.




























































































Table 10 Wald F-test for exclusion or currency substitution terms in M3
(see regression ( 15) and ( 17) in Table 9; sample period 1979 (2)-1993 (4) )
zero restriction on coefficient o f FD
zero restriction on coefficient o f dPPP(-l)
zero restriction on coefficients of FD and 
dPPP(-l)
F = 0 20 (0 66) 
F = 5 68 (0 02)* 
F = 2 84 (0 07)
Probabilities of rejection o f the null hypothesis when the latter is true in parenthesis 




























































































Table 11 Wald F-test for exclusion of currency substitution terms in M3
(see regression (16) and ( 17) in Table 9, sample period 1979 (2)-1993 (4) )
zero restriction on coefficient of FD
zero restriction on coefficient of dPPP(-l)
zero restriction on coefficients of FD and 
dPPP(-l)
F = 2 43 (0 13) 
F = 5.06 (0 03)* 
F = 3 15 (0 05)*
Probabilities of rejection of the null hypothesis when the latter is true in parenthesis 




























































































TABLE A l German demand function for real MI with alternative
measure of DM-dollar currency substitution (dRL)-
Sample period 1979(2)-1989(2) 1979(2)-1993(4)
No. o f regression : (7a) (14a)
explanatory variables
constant -0 48 (-0 79) -0 97 (-2 0)
DLY 041 (1 82) • 0 57(4 24)
DRS -1 68 (-2 92) -0.90 (-1 50)
FD -0.18 (-1 31) -0 23 (-1 47)
LM P(-l) -0.02 (-0 22) -0.15 (-191)
LY (-l) O il  (0 67) 0 32 ((2.25)
R S(-l) -0 35 (-2.70) -0.53 (4 53)
dRJL(-l) -0 005 (-1 88) -0 006 (-2.18)
VARER(-l) 0 003 (1.43) 0 002 (0 98)
DdRLS -0 006 (-0 95) 0 001 (0 19)
D874 -0 021 (-1 43) -0 024 (-1 46)
D901 — -0 04 (-2.22)
D902 — 0 10(5.29)
D903 - 0 07 (3.73)
D934 — 0 06(3 42)
R2 adjusted 0 939 0940
SER 0012 0015
DW 1 84 1 67
AR-CH12 (4) 4.55 (0.34) i 7 76(0.10)
AR-F (4) 0 72 (0.59) 1 40 (0 25)
ARCH-CHI2 (4) 1 98 (0 74) 4 51 (0 34)
ARCH-F (4) 0.45 (0.77) 1.12(0 36)
N-JB 1.08 (0 58) 0 40 (0 82)
RESET-F (1) 0 64(0  43) 0 05 (0 82)
T-statistics or probabilities of rejection of the null hypothesis when the 




























































































TABLE A2 German demand function for real M3 with alternative
measure of DM-dolIar currency substitution (dRL)-
Sample period 1979(2)-I989(2) 1979(2)-1993(4)
No. of regression : (10a) (16a)
explanatory variables
constant -0.71 (-1 63) -0 12 (-0 50)
DLY 0 15(1 12) 0 21 (2.56)
DRS -0 10 (-0 41) -0.12 (-0 46)
DRS(-l) -0.97 (-3 24) -0 75 (-2 22)
FD -0 16 (-1 97) -0 11 (-118)
LMP(-l) -0 06 (-0 81) -0 03 (-0.58)
LY(-l) 0 19(1.27) 0 06 (0 66)
RS(-l) -0 05 (-0 71) -0 18 (-2.53)
dRL(-l) -0.005 (-3 02) -0.003 (-1 85)
VARER(-l) 0 003 (2.39) 0 003 (2 07)
DdRLS(-l) -0 008 (-2 51) -0 006 (-1.79)
DdROS 0 005(1 19) 0.001 (0 14)
D903 0 07 (5.24)
D904 -0 009 (-0.74)
D911 0 12(10 14)
R2 adjusted 0684 0 829
SER 0.007 0009
DW 2.15 2 04
AR-CHI2 (4) 3.26 (0 51) 1.72 (0.79)
AR-F (4) 0.53 (0 71) 0 30(0 88)
ARCH-CHI2 (4) 0 95 (0 92) 1 32 (0 86)
ARCH-F (4) 0 21 (0 93) 0 31 (0 87)
N-JB 0 08 (0 96) 0 67(0.72)
RESET-F (1) 0.003 (0 95) 0 09 (0.76)
T-statistics or probabilities of rejection of the null hypothesis when the 




























































































TABLE A3 Scale variables expressed per capita, real M3 per capita, 
1979(2)-I989(2)
No. of regression : 
explanatory variables
( 10) (lOp)
constant -0.92 (-1.77) -0 29 (-1.96)
DLY 0.20(1.27) 0.30(1 94)
DRS -0.32 (-1.14) • -0.37 (-1 30)
DRS(-l) -0.75 (-2.41) -0 73 (-2 27)
FD -0.19 (-2.16) -0.23 (-2 48)
LM P(-l) -0.10 (-1.14) -0.15 (-1.58)
LY(-I) 0 27(1.48) 0.36 (1.88)
RS(-l) -0.18 (-2.01) -0.16 (-1.71)
dRL(-l) -0.03 (-2.39) -0.04 (-2 52)
VARER(-l) 0 004 (2.73) 0.003 (2.37)
DdRLS(-l) -0.007 (-1.97) -0.006 (-1.70)
DdROS 0 004 (0.96) 0 006(1.22)
R2 adjusted 0.516 0.517
SER 0.007 0.007
DW 2.22 2.30
AR-CHI2 (4) 3.36(0.50) 2.09 (0 72)
AR-F (4) 0.55 (0.70) 0 33 (0 85)
ARCH-CHI2 (4) 4 28 (0 37) 0 80 (0.95)
ARCH-F (4) 1 05 (0.40) 0 18 (0 95)
N-JB 0 29 (0.87) 1.01 (0 60)
RESET-F (1) 1 09(0.30) 0 78 (0.39)
T-statistics or probabilities of rejection of the null hypothesis when the 




























































































FIG. 1 CUSUM OF SQUARES TEST ON THE RESIDUALS OF REGRESSION 10 TABLE 6 
( real M3 with new explanatory variables ): 1979 (2) - 1989 (2)




























































































FIG. 2 - RECURSIVE PARAMETER ESTIMATES ON THE COEFFICIENT OF FD IN
REGRESSION 10 OF TABLE 6 (REAL M3) : 1979 (2) - IRAQ (9 \




























































































F ie . - Recursive parameter estimates on the coefficient of dPPP-1 in
regression 10 of table 6 (real M3)~f 1379 (2 ) —  1989 ( 2 ) ---------------------------




























































































FIG. 4 - CUSUM OF SQUARES STABILITY TEST - REGR. (12) of table 8
REAL Ml - 1979 (2) - 1993 (4)




























































































f i g . 5 - RECURSIVE PARAMETER ESTIMATES - COEFFICIENT OF dPPP
(12) OF TABLE 8 - REAL Ml - 1979 (2) - 1993 (4) - REGRESSION




























































































FIG. 6 - CUSUM OF SQUARES STABILITY TEST - REGR. (16) OF TABLE 9 - REAL
..M3 - 1979 (2) - 1993 (4)




























































































FIG. 7 - RECURSIVE PARAMETER ESTIMATES - COEFFICIENT OF dPPP - REGRESSION
(15) of table 9 - REAL M3 - 1979 (2) - 1993 (4)
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